PART 76
The Chronicle of Battle Abbey is as good a document as we can probably get that points to Crowhurst as the original site of the Battle of Hastings. However there is more. Identifying the site as somewhere in that manor is narrowed down by the inclusion of the event known as the "Malfosse" incident.
The Malfosse incident is recorded in the Chronicle of Battle Abbey and also alluded to in Wace. It records where at the end of the battle the English desert the field. They are pursued by a number of Norman knights on horseback, who die in a huge ditch adjacent to the battlefield. This is another unsolved issues relating to the battle site located at the Abbey, since no such place exists there.
The Chronicle describes the events thus:"Lamentably, just where the fighting was going on, and stretching for some considerable distance, an immense ditch yawned. It may have been a natural cleft in the earth or perhaps it had been hollowed out by storms. But in this waste ground it was overgrown with brambles and thistles, and could scarcely be seen in time; and it engulfed great numbers, especially the Normans in pursuit of the English. For, when all unknowing, they came galloping on, their terrific impetus carried them headlong down into it, and they died tragically, pounded to pieces. This deep pit has been named for the accident, and today it is called the Malfosse."
No Malfosse exists at Battle Abbey site, although like the other names from the Chronicle one was created at a much later date north of the Abbey, in a crude attempt to justify all elements within the lands of the Abbey itself. It was like the other places within the Abbey lands, which were named after events detailed in the Chronicle. The real battle site, which we shall deal with shortly, has all the identification marks including the path leading from the battlefield to the Malfosse, where so many Norman knights died. None of the important identifying features are missing, because it is I believe the correct location.
The description in the Battle Abbey Chronicle makes it clear this is not just a ditch, but a significant cleft in the landscape, probably caused by storms. An area of land that was "waste land" concealing the drop where brambles and thistles grow. That land is still today as it was on the day of the battle and is adjacent to the correct battle site.
The English had formed their main defense behind their shield wall and also behind the main defensive stakes across the battlefield. This was the main and last line of defense where Harold was located with his standards. If the Normans broke through here the game was up for the Saxons and retreat in order to reform was necessary.
It is therefore relevant to note that the footpath that leads to the Malfosse does so from a position which would allow the Saxons to flee the field without allowing the Normans to follow. This path was another trap set by those who planned the battle. It demonstrates that considerable care was taken in choosing exactly where to place the defensive line. If the defensive line were 50 meters further up the hill this exit would not have been available to the Saxons.
Unlike the Battle Abbey site the correct battle site is laid out on a steep hill at the entrance to the Crowhurst valley, where those who had been camped at the Norman camp, at Upper Wilting at the port of Hastings, were forced by the terrain into a narrow corridor along the then London Road. That corridor had the Malfosse on one side of the battlefield and another cleft on the opposite side of the field, with the dense thicket of the wood called the Forewood to the west - making another route impossible. As Wace comments; the Normans were forced to come to Harold.
Crowhurst was Harold's manor - he owned it and almost certainly had personal knowledge of the lie of the land. The decision to stop at this particular place was a tactical move, which forced the Norman's hand. It was a decision that those who study warfare will give Harold great credit for, because Harold then reinforced his defense with a ditch with stakes across the battlefield. This was not the normal way that the Saxons of the day fought. Harold was creating a new form of defense and it explains why the Normans, with their war-horses were unable to penetrate the Saxon line.
Historians have criticised Harold for his rashness in marching from Stamford Bridge straight to the site of the Battle of Hastings. They did not know there was a good reason to do that. Harold knew the land, as he was it's lord - a title that is confirmed by the person who delivers the message to him at Stamford Bridge - where it is reported in the Carmen with the words "Harold his Lord" are recorded.
Harold realised, as I did, that if William was camped at Wilting Manor, by the port of Hastings, the Normans were in serious trouble if a defense were mounted on the Crowhurst side of the Ridge south of Telham. The land did not allow the Normans to exit the peninsular without passing through one particular place where the road was confined on both sides by impassable clefts in the landscape. This is local knowledge that I have and so it appears did Harold. Those who held the land to the north could build a defense and starve the invaders to death, because they could not get provisions once the supply ran out.
William had no choice. If he did not engage the English early on the morning after the Saxons arrived the Normans would never have got off the peninsular alive. Indeed a battle would probably never take place if Harold was allowed to fortify that defense with major structures. The lay of the land is shown as follows:
The roads marked on this map and place names are those used today, with the sea coloured blue. Since 1066 the sea has retreated leaving marsh and now some farm land close to Battle Abbey. Historians have long understood the significance of the Abbey marking the entrance to the peninsular and have assumed that this was why the Battle of Hastings was fought there. However most historians have never visited the area and few if any have ever gone beyond Battle along the old London road, as opposed to the post 1840 ridge road. They have read the theory, but not understood Harold's mind. He knew the significance of the road from Battle to Crowhurst because he was lord of that manor and I am absolutely certain from his actions he knew that land well.
If Harold had fought this battle at the Abbey site he would have had a very small chance of success against the Normans, because they could destroy the Saxons with their horse in open country. Harold had seen and fought with them in France. He knew their leader and he knew their fighting strategy. William's men fought with war horses. These horses where massive compared to a man on foot and Harold knew his men were used to fighting on foot. These horses were the equivalent of today's tanks against infantry and standing men had little chance against a ton of horse in full gallop with an armored knight on its back.
Every year the Saxons reform for the Battle Abbey re-enactments, where men line up on each side of the slope to fight each other on foot. That is not what William had planned and only because of Harold's tenacity did that eventually happen. If the battle had been allowed to happen at the Battle Abbey site Harold and his men would have been wiped from the face of the earth by 500 battle hardened horses at the first charge. That site has no confinement for the horses and no ability to stop circumvention of the defensive line.
Only at the end of the battle were the Normans able to engage their heavy horse to attack the fleeing English. That should have been with devastating effect, except a contingency plan appeared to exist for that too. The path to the Malfosse was strategically positioned to allow fast exit. Those on horse unfamiliar with the territory would find themselves running down a narrow path through undulating thicket that is a not unduly steep. However those who did not stay on the path following on horse, would find themselves in a headlong dash towards a fifteen to twenty foot drop to certain death. Not enough to necessarily kill a man on his own, but on a horse with no-where to go, and others behind, it was a formulae for the disaster which happened to the Normans.
Even today it is possible to see this path in the thicket that has since grown, as it forms part of the old track network that connected the Crowhurst Roman bloomery system. Those old tracks are still marked on the Ordnance Survey maps as hedgerows that align to the bloomeries at Forewood, Bynes Farm and Crowhurst Park. They may appear today as hedgerows today, but and were made by men long ago and now form the boundaries of land which has long since been sold or broken into small parcels.
These tracks were created during the Roman period, when the Crowhurst valley went through a major period of occupation. Little remains today, but we know that the main bloomery at Beauport Park produced most of the iron needed for Caesars legions. An extensive track system developed to move the iron ore to the ancient port of Hastings on the Bulverhythe using carts. These carts left their mark in the landscape. Whilst they may not be observed by those who pass them every day, they can still be seen by the trained eye, as they pass through or remain part of the boundaries of land.
The issue of the Roman tracks has been dealt with in some detail in the Roman Development Chapter. That chapter dealt with the infrastructure connections between Beauport Park bloomery and the port of Hastings. It showed that there was a reason for the Romans to use that port and argued that this network was part of a major iron production process. The discovery of major industrialisation deposits at the port area by Smyth and Jennings is also documented on this site in the correspondence section.
The track network that developed in the Crowhurst valley was not my invention to somehow persuade the Inquiry in 1996 that the site at Wilting was in some special need of preservation. I simply reported the evidence that exists and drew conclusions which were logical and persuasive. The Wilting and Norman Camp site are not historical sites that exist in isolation, as road developers may wish to believe. They are all connected, because the Romans were there first, quite a long time before the Normans considered Hastings a good port to secure themselves.
The Bloomery at Beuport Park was by far the largest in the south-east of England, but the garrison that looked after it also had a number of lesser bloomeries within their control. This required Roman road connections to enable the industrious extraction in an efficient manner. It also needed roads able to take substantial loads, which could be used all year. Those roads had to enable passage of carts pulled by oxen or horses in Summer and Winter.
The design therefore of the track system between the main bloomery at Beauport Park on the south- east side of the Ridge was designed to run down hill from each of the sub-bloomeries. This was not possible on all sections because of the nature of the land. However the sections between the actual bloomeries themselves, as opposed to the tracks that connected the bloomeries to each other did that, as much as was humanly possible.
This map shows where the three sub-bloomeries of Beauport Park were located and the tracks that connected them. Each ended in a system for loading barges in the inland lake at the old port of Hastings. The bridge at the Malfosse is identified at the top of the aerial photo with the red dot - this is private land and not open to viewing without an appointment. Uninvited guests should be aware that the farmer who owns this land also owns a considerable number of Doberman dogs who roam this area unsupervised.
This view cannot be seen from the battlefield, as it is obscured by trees. Once into the wood there is low vegetation, including a lot of briars making it difficult to run through. However the land is moderately open, although undulating in a downwards direction, making it easier on a large horse in gallop. Those who came off of the battlefield on horse at speed would see this view in front of them and assume it was safe to continue at speed. There is a strong illusion that the open field in front of you connects to your ground in the next fifty yards.
In fact looking north along the Malfosse the drop is quite apparent:
A bridge was necessary here because the drop in the land was too great for carts to cross without it. The original position of that bridge was probably higher than the replacement, which we can see the remains of today. However the earthen platform position, where the higher connection was probably located, can still be seen in this photograph, about half way up the photograph on the left hand side of the ravine.
Those who took the path on foot escaped to higher ground over the ravine bridge, whereas those who followed by horse never got that far. Perhaps Harold had planned this as an exit for the nobility, should that be needed. As we know fate was not with him that day. His planning undoubtedly cost the Normans dearly and saved many who would otherwise have perished at the end of the battle. This is the Malfosee of which so much has been written by historians in the past. Today it is very much the same as it must have been then. A place of death in 1066, but today a place of serene beauty, where the only visitors are the animals of the forest.
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